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Horton: Practice and Procedure

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Although there were no landmark decisions in the practice and procedure area during the survey period, the cases
reported herein were felt to be of sufficient interest to merit
consideration.
I. PRETRIAL
A. Jurisdiction
In Jones v. Barco Inc.,' an action was brought on an allegedly usurious note and a master in equity was directed to
hear and decide all issues of fact and law. The plaintiffs
sought the statutory penalty on the allegedly usurious note
delivered by the plaintiff to Barco, the alleged agent or
co-conspirator of North American Acceptance Corporation.
Barco defaulted and North American denied the allegation,
claiming to be a holder in due course and that the plaintiffs
were seeking two recoveries on the same set of facts. North
American counterclaimed by seeking foreclosure of the mortgage securing the note - an equitable action. On North
American's motion, the matter was referred to a master in
equity to hear and decide all issues of law and fact, despite
the plaintiff's insistance that they were entitled to a jury trial
of the factual issues arising in their action at law.
The supreme court held that by the clear and explicit language of section 10-14022 the right to a compulsory reference
in a law action is limited to equitable issues. Because this was
an action at law, the South Carolina Constitution demands
that the right to a jury trial be preserved inviolate,3 and the
lower court's error was not cured by the attempted grant
to the plaintiffs of the right to move for a jury trial after
the finding of the master.
B. Pendancy
In Mayer v. Master Feed & Grain Co.4 an action to void a
renunciation of dower was instituted, by service of summons
1. 159 S.E.2d 279 (S.C. 1968).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1402 (1962) provides: "When the parties do

not consent the court may, upon application of either or its own motion,

direct a reference in the following cases: (1) In all equitable actions and

equitable issues in actions at law ....
3. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 25.

4. 250 S.C. 275, 157 S.E.2d 413 (1967).
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only, in Charleston County. Before service of the complaint
was demanded the defendant commenced another action in
Colleton County by serving a summons and complaint on the
plaintiff and her husband (a co-defendant in the Charleston
action). The plaintiff in the Charleston action answered the
Colleton action, setting up the pending suit in Charleston
County and asserting that her rights should be settled there.
The defendant demurred to the complaint in the Charleston
action on the ground that there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause in Colleton
County and moved for a change of venue to permit consolidation of the two actions. This motion was denied.
The supreme court held that service of summons by the
plaintiff, even without a complaint, effectively commenced
an action. Accordingly, the defendant could not demur to
the complaint on the ground that there was another action
pending when that other action was commenced subsequent
to the service of summons. Furthermore the demurrer was
not proper because the complaint did not show another action was pending."
C. Service of Process
In Seubert v. Buchanan,6 the plaintiff left a copy of a
summons and complaint at the defendant's medical office by
sliding the papers under the door. At that time the defendant
was on vacation. After returning, he made a special appearance, objecting to the court's jurisdiction of his person on
the ground that there had been no lawful service. His motion was denied.
The supreme court quoted from section 10-438 of the South
Carolina Code 7 and found the statute was not susceptible
of the construction which the plaintiff urged - that if the
summons comes into the actual possession of the defendant
by any means, the requirements of personal delivery do not
apply. The defendant was held not to be properly before the
court because he had not been served.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-642(3) (1962).

6. 250 S.C. 140, 156 S.E.2d 632 (1967).

7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-438 (1962) provides:

"[Tihe summons shall

be served by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to

any person of discretion residing at the residence or employed at the place

of business of the defendant."
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D. Discovery
In Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Railway," our court
rejected the "managing agent" theory in pre-trial examination of a corporation through its employees.9 This theory,
followed almost universally in federal courts, as well as in
several states, dictates that pre-trial examination of a corporation must be made through an officer or "managing agent"
of the corporation, and that subordinates without general
capacity to act in behalf of the corporation are not proper
subjects through which the corporation may be examined.
In the instant case, the plaintiff was permitted to examine
the defendant's engineer because the information sought lay
solely within the engineer's knowledge.
In Kimmerlin v. Bloom,10 the supreme court found that an
order requiring an oral examination of one of the defendants,
issued in the trial court's discretion under the authority of
section 26-503, was not appealable before final judgment since
the order did not involve the merits or affect any substantial
rights of the defendant.
E. Pleadings
The defendant in Glenn v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 11
demurred to the plaintiff's complaint which in form stated
two causes of action, one sounding in contract and the other
in tort, on the ground that the two causes had been improperly united. The circuit judge overruled the demurrer
and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the complaint
set forth only one primary right on the plaintiff's part and
one primary wrong on the defendant's part and sought a
single recovery. Several decisions supporting this conclusion
were cited.12
Ii. TRIAL
A. Res Judicata
In Powell v. Powell,13 the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County denied the wife alimony while awarding the
8. 159 S.E.2d 243 (S.C. 1968).

9.
10.
11.
12.
Miles
13.

For a thorough discussion of this case see 20 S.C.L. REv. 358 (1968).
159 S.E.2d 910 (S.C. 1968).
250 S.C. 323, 157 S.E.2d 630 (1967).
Columbia v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 158 S.C. 511, 155 S.E. 841 (1930);
v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 87 S.C. 254, 69 S.E. 292 (1910).
249 S.C. 663, 156 S.E.2d 305 (1967).
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husband a divorce on the ground of desertion. The Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court for that county in a prior
action had awarded separate support to the wife on the
factual basis that she had left the marital abode for good
cause. In the present action she pleaded that prior judgment
unsuccessfully. On appeal the supreme court said the two
courts had concurrent original jurisdiction in actions for separate support and for divorce, and that a prior judgment of
either court was binding on the other as to all questions actually litigated in the prior action. The husband's divorce
action was on the claim that his wife deserted him without
just cause - a point determined against him in the prior
action. Accordingly, he was precluded from bringing his
action.
Deaton v. Gay Trucking Co.,14 a federal case, concerned
actions arising out of a single accident in which three sisters
were killed. An action for the wrongful death"5 of one of the
girls was unsuccessful. An action was then brought under
the "survival" statute0 for that girl, along with actions for
wrongful death of the other two. The defendant moved for a
summary judgment in each case on the ground that the issues
involved had been resolved by a jury in the prior unsuccessful wrongful death action and that the matter was either
res judicata or the plaintiffs were estopped by the prior judgment. The motion was refused.
The supreme court held that a judgment for a defendant
in a wrongful death action does not constitute an estoppel by
judgment and is not res judicata as to subsequent actions
under South Carolina's survival statute. This is true even
when the ultimate beneficiaries, the decedent's grandparents
in this case, are the same. Similarly a judgment for a defendant on an action by an administratrix for the death of one
child was no bar against the bringing of a subsequent action
for the other children, because the administratrix was suing
in different capacities.
The question of whether a prior action was res judicata also
arose in London v. Surety Indemnity Co.' 7 London was injured
14. 275 F. Supp. 750 (D.S.C. 1967).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (1962).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-209 (1962).

17. 250 S.C. 26, 156 S.E.2d 329 (1967).
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when an automobile belonging to McPhail, Sr., but driven by
one Graham while under the management of McPhail, Jr.,
crashed. In a prior action London received a fifteen thousand
dollar verdict against Graham in a suit against Graham and
McPhail, Jr., who was absolved of negligently allowing an
intoxicated person to operate the car. The present suit was
brought to collect ten thousand dollars under an omnibus
clause of an insurance policy issued to McPhail, Sr, who
claims that the prior action is res judicata because it established Graham had no permission from McPhail, Jr.
The supreme court, on the authority of Johnston-Crews Co.
v. Folk,'8 held that the cause of action in the two suits was
different, the first being in tort and the latter in contract and
that since that was true, the tort judgment would not be a
bar unless the issue of permission of McPhail, Sr. was adjudicated. The court further found that McPhail, Sr. was
not a party to the first action and that the issues in that
action were not whether permission had been given by him
but whether it had been negligently given by McPhail, Jr.
On the state level in Wold v. Funderburg,19 the Funderburgs had procured a decree of adoption of two children in
the Superior Court for Richmond County, Georgia - a court
of record. The natural mother (plaintiff here) had earlier
brought an unsuccessful action, against the Funderburgs only,
to invalidate the decree in that same court. She then brought
this action in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Aiken County (which is not a court of record) against the
Funderburgs, the minor children, and John Crawford (the
natural father). She asked the court to grant her custody and
to set aside the Georgia decree because her consenting signature was obtained, if at all, through fraud and that Crawford's signature was forged. Crawford filed an answer alleging that his signature was forged and requesting that the
adoption be voided and the children returned to the mother.
The defendants interposed a general denial and claimed that
the Georgia action was res judicata. The supreme court upheld a finding for the plaintiff though it noted that this action amounted to a collateral attack on the Georgia decree.
The general rule is that a judgment cannot be so attacked
18. 118 S.C. 470, 111 S.E. 15 (1921).
19. 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967).
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unless fraud has been practiced in obtaining the judgment.2 0
The supreme court found this requirement was satisfied by
proof of the fraudulent signatures. It then found that the
Florence court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Georgia
court over the subject matter of adoption since both courts
were authorized by constitution or statute to deal with the
matter. It also found that the court had personal jurisdiction
over the adopting parents and children,, all of whom were
residing in this state. Finally, the court felt the inclusion of
the father and the children as parties to the present action
was sufficient to overcome the res judicata aspect of a decree to which only the Funderburgs were parties.
R. Discretion of the Trial Judge
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Rural Land
Co.21 involved a complex condemnation proceeding occasioned
by 1-95 running through the 10,500-acre plantation of the
defendant. The highway's route resulted in 90.5 acres being
condemned and parcels of 484.3, 122.9, and 165.7 acres being
separated from the main portion. Due to the involved nature
of the case a pre-trial conference with the judge and all counsel
present was held. At that time the Highway Department's
counsel introduced plans which the parties agreed represented
the physical aspects of the road construction. The landowner
prepared his case in the light of these plans but at the trial
the Highway Department's counsel offered evidence of proposed modifications of the plans which could have had the
affect of reducing the landowner's damages. The court excluded this evidence because the landowner had not had the
benefit of the altered plans until after the trial commenced.
As a result of the exclusion of this evidence, the department
moved for a mistrial but this also was refused.
Noting that this precise point had not arisen before in
South Carolina, the supreme court held the trial judge had
not abused his discretion in excluding the evidence and that
the plaintiff was not entitled to a mistrial. However, the court
specifically stated that they were not holding that a condemner could under no circumstances offer evidence as to
proposed changes of construction affecting the issue of dam20. Piedmont Press Ass'n v. Record Pub. Co., 156 S.C. 43, 152 S.E. 721
(1930).
21. 250 S.C. 12, 156 S.E.2d 333 (1967).
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ages but were merely holding that under the circumstances
of this litigation there was no error.
Another contention of the plaintiff was that the trial judge
erred in his charge to the jury by identifying certain portions
of the charge, which were admittedly properly charged, as
being requested charges of the Highway Department. The
court observed that the practice has been subjected to some
criticism, but it is not reversible error. 22
C. Directed Verdict
In Foster v. United Insurance Company of America,23 the
defendant moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiff's
testimony had established the lack of an insurable interest.
At the close of the defendant's argument, but before the court
ruled on the directed verdict motion, the plaintiff was allowed
a non-suit without prejudice on his plea that the defendant
had not pleaded lack of insurable interest and that the plaintiff
was therefore surprised.
The supreme court found that the defendant should have
been granted a directed verdict, since to hold otherwise would
allow the plaintiff to reassert an unmeritorious cause of action, materially injure the defendant, and take up the court's
time. The court also noted that lack of insurable interest did
not have to be pleaded as an affirmative defense. 24

III. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. Court's Authority to Set Referee's Fees
In Singleton v. Collins25 the only exception with merit
concerned the lower court's fixing of the fee of a special
referee and ordering it to be paid by the defendant. The defendant contended that by virtue of section 27-70126 a referee's fee is limited to ten dollars per day. The supreme
22. 88 C...S. Trial § 411(c)

(1955); 53 AAT. JUR. Trial § 538 (1945).

23. 158 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1967).

24. See generally 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1319(b) (1946); 29A Am. JuR.
Insurance § 1842 (1960).
25. 161 S.E.2d 246 (S.C. 1968).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-701 (1962) provides:
The following schedule of fees contains the amount of costs
authorized to be taxed and collected in Horry County ...
(41) Reference, each day engaged in holding
$10.00
(43) Report on reference, making up and returning - $10.00
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court, observing that the liability of the parties reasonably to
compensate the referee was not an issue before the court,
held that the lower court in the absence of a stipulation could
not fix a fee in excess of the statute and direct it to be paid.
However, the court noted that in such a case there was at
least an implied obligation on the part of the party's counsel
to see that the referee was paid a reasonable fee for his
service.
B. Interlocutory Appeal
McCombs v. Bridges2 7 concerned an appeal from the denial of a lower court to strike certain allegations of the
complaint as irrelevant, immaterial and redundant, and the
denial of a motion for a more definite complaint. The supreme
court held it well settled that an interlocutory appeal from
an order refusing to strike allegations of a pleading as irrelevant and uncertain would not lie, 28 and that an order requiring a more definite and certain complaint was not ap29
pealable until after final judgment.
C. Standing to Sue
Gunn v. Rollings30 concerned a suit brought by two unadopted children for injuries arising from the same accident in which the defendant's decedent, their step-father, was
killed. One defense interposed was that the decedent stood
in loco parentis to the minors at the time of the accident because they lived in the same household and had voluntarily
assumed the relationship of parent and children. Because of
this relationship the defendant contended that the unemancipated minors could not maintain the action. The plaintiff's
demurrer to this defense was sustained by the lower court.
The supreme court said the exact point had never been
presented before in South Carolina, although it was settled
law that an unemancipated child has no right of action against
a parent for injuries caused by the parent's recklessness.3 1
The court held that one in loco parentis, since he has the
27. 161 S.E.2d 817 (S.C. 1968).
28. Register v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 504, 151 S.E.2d 640
(1966).
29. Oxnan v. Profitt, 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
30. 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967).
31. Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Maxey v.
Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963).
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same obligations and rights as a natural parent, has the same
immunity from tort liability as does a natural or adoptive
parent. 2 It was concluded that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
D. Default Judgments on Unliquidated Accounts
The defendant in Morgan's Inc. v. Surinam LumUer Corp.38
appealed from a default judgment entered for the amount
prayed for in the plaintiff's complaint. His main contention
was that the judgment was improperly entered without the
taking of testimony in proof of the accounts sued on. No
itemized, verified statement of the account was served upon
the defendant although one was filed with the clerk of court
along with the complaint.
The supreme court stated that section 10-1531 of the South
Carolina Code permitted entry of a default judgment on
unliquidated accounts upon pleadings only when an itemized,
verified statement of the account was served with the summons and complaint. Thus while service of a complaint may
be satisfied by notice of where it is filed, the service of a
statement of the account cannot, but must be served with the
summons. In the event that this procedure is not followed,
the plaintiff must introduce testimony in proof of the account in order to obtain a valid judgment. The court concluded that the lower court correctly ruled that the defendant
was in default, but erred in refusing to vacate the judgment.
E. Time for Answering
The wife in Lanier v. Lanier 4 appealed from an order denying her petition for leave to answer, and declaring her to be
in default and her husband entitled to an order of reference
without further notice to her. The court had so held because
the wife, after an attempt at re-cohabitation, took their children and left, violating a previous court order granting the
husband exclusive temporary custody. Her reason for not
answering her husband's complaint was the resumed cohabitation. This she pleaded as a defense in her proposed answer.
32. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 72-3 (1950).

33. 160 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. 1968).
34. 160 S.E.2d 558 (S.C. 1968).
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The supreme court said that, even assuming that the temporary court order was still in effect after the resumed cohabitation, the lower court still erred in not granting her
permission to answer. The high court felt her petition (filed
shortly after commencement of the action) clearly established
a prima facie case of excusable neglect and a meritorious
5
defense, all that is required under the statute. 8
LEWIS S.

35. S.C.

CODE ANN.

HORTON

§§ 10-609, -1213 (1962).
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